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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States,1 the United 
States Supreme Court unanimously overturned the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,2 as well as years of 
deference to Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) practices, holding 
that the VA must conduct market research to determine if at least two 
service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSBs) or 
veteran-owned small businesses (VOSBs) are capable of performing 
a proposed procurement contract before it issues a solicitation.3 The 
Court made this decision pursuant to the Veterans Benefits, Health 
Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006 (Veterans Act),4 
which requires the VA to restrict its competitive bidding process if at 
least two businesses are found, even if the proposed procurement is 
to be made through the General Services Administration’s (GSA) 
Federal Supply Schedule program (FSS). This calculus is commonly 
referred to as the “Rule of Two.”5 
1. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016).
2. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 754 F.3d 923 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
rev’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1969. 
3. Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. at 1979.
4. 38 U.S.C. § 8127(d) (2012).
[A] contracting officer of the Department shall award contracts on the 
basis of competition restricted to small business concerns owned and 
controlled by veterans if the contracting officer has a reasonable 
expectation that two or more small business concerns owned and 
controlled by veterans will submit offers and that the award can be made 
at a fair and reasonable price that offers best value to the United States. 
Id. 
5. For a detailed history of the Rule of Two, see infra Section II.C. The
following abbreviations are used regularly throughout this Note: EDWOSBs 
(Economically Disadvantaged Women-Owned Small Businesses), FAR (Federal 
Acquisitions Requirements), FSS (Federal Supply Schedule), GOA (Government 
2
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If ever there was a chance for the judiciary to put “veterans 
first,”6 this was it. While the result is a huge win for business-owning 
veterans, who stand to reap significant monetary benefits,7 the 
Kingdomware holding will likely have much further-reaching negative 
effects on government contracting in general.8 The holding may also 
impede the efficiency of an already overburdened VA in particular.9 
Perhaps most significantly, the Kingdomware decision may negatively 
affect other disadvantaged small business contractors.10 It is 
therefore imperative that Congress take steps to correct the 
problems that are likely to manifest in the coming years as a result of 
the Court’s decision and restore some semblance of equity to the 
VA’s contracting practices. 
Accountability Office), GSA (General Services Administration), SBA (Small 
Business Act), SDVOSBs (Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses), VA 
(Department of Veteran’s Affairs), VOSBs (Veteran-Owned Small Businesses), and 
WOSBs (Women-Owned Small Businesses). 
6. For an example of the legislature attempting to accomplish a similar result,
see Leo Shane III, Senators Push to Advance Sweeping Veterans Bill Before July 4, MILITARY
TIMES (June 23, 2016), http://www.militarytimes.com/story/veterans/2016/06/23 
/senate-floor-push-veterans-first-act/86281538/. 
7. See Steven Koprince, Victory! SDVOSBs Win in Kingdomware Supreme Court
Decision, SMALLGOVCON (June 16, 2016), http://smallgovcon.com/service-disabled 
-veteran-owned-small-businesses/victory-sdvosbs-win-in-kingdomware-supreme      
-court-decision/ (“[T]he Kingdomware decision will prove a major boon to SDVOSBs 
and VOSBs, ultimately resulting in billions of extra dollars flowing to veteran-owned 
companies.”). 
8. See Beyond the Bench: Ramifications of the Supreme Court Kingdomware Decision:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small Bus. and Entrepreneurship, 114th Cong. (2016) 
[hereinafter Hearing], https://www.sbc.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/6 
/beyond-the-bench-ramifications-of-the-supreme-court-kingdomware-decision 
(statement of A. John Shoraka, Associate Administrator, Office of Government 
Contracting and Business Development, at 3–4). 
9. Brief for the United States at 39, Kingdomware Techs., Inc., v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016) (No. 14-916), 2015 WL 5719745 (“The ability to place 
orders under the FSS is often essential to the VA’s effective and expeditious 
performance of its obligations to veterans.”). 
10. Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of A. John Shoraka, Associate
Administrator, Office of Government Contracting and Business Development, at 3) 
(“The limitation on the VA’s discretion to consider use of other small business 
programs when the rule of two can be met by service disabled veteran owned small 
businesses will likely affect the level of awards made by the VA to support WOSBs, 
8(a) and SDBs, and HUBZone small businesses, all of which have experienced 
important positive upward trends in recent years.”). 
3
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This Note begins with an overview of the primary players in the 
decade-long fight over government contract set-asides, a discussion 
of the Rule of Two, the relevant law that spawned it, and the history 
behind it.11 Next, the analysis moves to an in-depth exploration of 
the judicial progression of Kingdomware and the Court’s reasoning.12 
Then, this Note outlines the potential wide-reaching effects of the 
Kingdomware holding with regard to veterans, the VA, other 
government agency contracts, and nonveteran small businesses.13 
Although these effects are concerning, efforts of Congress can solve 
the outlined issues. This Note proposes such legislative remedies that 
would restore smooth and equitable VA contracting while still 
putting American veterans first.14 Finally, this Note concludes that 
the Court’s legal analysis, while sound, creates several potential 
issues for the VA and other government agencies.15 If Congress does 
not act to rectify the situation, agencies may face inefficiencies and 
discrepancies in current contract set-aside practices that require 
legislative attention, and other disadvantaged small business 
contractors will likely see a substantial decrease in government-
sourced opportunities.16 
II. HISTORY
A. The Federal Supply Schedule 
While government contracting in America is a big business that 
takes many forms, one common tool for government agencies is the 
Federal Supply Schedule. The Court explained that “[t]he Federal 
Supply Schedule (FSS) generally is a streamlined method for 
Government agencies to acquire certain supplies and services in 
bulk, such as office supplies or food equipment.”17 Prior to 1949, 
“government agencies entered procurement contracts and 
purchased supplies and services on an individual basis.”18 However, 
“[o]ver time, federal contracting became more centralized. The 
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Section IV.A.
14. See infra Section IV.B.
15. See infra Sections IV.A.3, B.1.
16. See infra Part V.
17. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1974 (2016)
(citing 48 C.F.R. § 8.402(a) (2015)). 
18. Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. McHugh, 707 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
4
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Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 created the 
GSA to standardize federal procurement processes and procure, 
store, and distribute supplies to federal agencies.”19 
Since its inception, the GSA has directed and managed the FSS20 
with the purpose of increasing efficiency in the procurement process 
for certain types of orders by having prenegotiated contracts 
between vendors and the GSA rather than conducting a bidding 
process for each individual order.21 Through the FSS, “[i]ndefinite 
delivery contracts are awarded to provide supplies and services at 
stated prices for given periods of time.”22 
Prior to the enactment of the Veterans Benefits, Health Care, 
and Information Technology Act of 2006,23 the FSS was “utilized as 
a procurement method separate and apart from traditional 
procurement methods and set-aside provisions found elsewhere in 
the FAR [Federal Acquisitions Requirements].”24 The VA has 
therefore relied on this historical understanding of the FSS and 
repeatedly asserted that the Rule of Two25 does not apply to orders 
made through the FSS.26 It is that very assertion that was overturned 
by the Supreme Court in Kingdomware. This Note will now briefly 
discuss the history of the VA and the ongoing tension between 
government agencies, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), SDVOSBs, and VOSBs that came to a head in Kingdomware. 
19. Id. (citation omitted).
20. The FSS is established by 41 C.F.R. § 105-53.145. 41 C.F.R. § 105-53.145
(2016). 
21. 48 C.F.R. § 8.402(a) (2016).
22. Id.
23. Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-461, §§ 502, 503, 120 Stat. 3403, 3431–36 (2006). 
24. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 226, 231 (2012),
aff’d, 754 F.3d 923 (Fed. Cir. 2014), rev’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016); see 
also K-Lak Corp. v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 1, 2 n.3 (2011) (“The competition 
procedures in FAR Parts 13, 14, and 15 and the Small Business Program rules in 
FAR Part 19 do not apply to orders placed against and fully within the scope of 
existing FSS contracts.”). 
25. See infra Section II.C.
26. See Kingdomware Techs., B-406507, 2012 WL 1942256, at *1–2 (Comp.
Gen. May 30, 2012); Aldevra, B-406205, 2012 WL 860813, at *3 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 
14, 2012). 
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B. The Department of Veterans Affairs 
For many, the VA is a largely unknown government agency, 
perhaps only recognized for scandals and administrative 
shortcomings that the media sporadically covers.27 However, the VA 
is actually a behemoth government agency that has a storied history, 
enormous influence, and substantial resources. In fact, the VA is one 
of the oldest and largest government agencies, tracing its roots back 
to the American Revolution.28 Since its early beginnings, the VA has 
continuously evolved and taken on increasing responsibility.  
President Hoover created the modern VA in 1930 through a 
consolidation of several agencies that administered veteran 
benefits.29 In 1930, the VA was charged with providing medical 
services for war veterans, disability compensation and allowances, life 
insurance, and retirement and pension payments.30 At that point, it 
had an operating budget of $786 million and was serving 4.6 million 
veterans.31 In the years since, the VA has been elevated to a cabinet 
level agency and has dramatically expanded its coverage and 
services. The agency now has an operating budget of over $75 billion 
and serves nearly twenty-five million veterans.32 It is therefore 
evident that the VA has immense and wide-ranging influence as an 
agency. 
Considering the amount of money spent by the agency annually 
and the huge number of veterans it services, the actions of the VA 
have immediate and life-changing effects that cannot be 
understated. While such a powerful government agency is not often 
told what it can and cannot do by anyone other than Congress or the 
President, the GAO recommended seventeen times that the VA 
reconsider its position regarding the Rule of Two, and the VA 
27. For a small sampling of the various scandals that have plagued the VA, see
Michael Pearson, The VA’s Troubled History, CNN (May 30, 2014 12:40 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/23/politics/va-scandals-timeline/. 
28. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA HISTORY IN BRIEF,
https://www.va.gov/opa/publications/archives/docs/history_in_brief.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2017). 
29. Id. at 12.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 31.
32. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS FISCAL
YEAR 2017 BUDGET REQUEST FACT SHEET (2017), 
https://www.va.gov/budget/docs/summary/Fy2017-VAsBudgetFactSheet.pdf. 
6
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repeatedly refused.33 It is therefore important to understand what 
purpose the GAO serves and what exactly its recommendations to 
the VA mean in the context of Kingdomware. 
C. The Government Accountability Office 
The GAO, often referred to as the “congressional watchdog,” is 
an independent, nonpartisan agency that “investigates how the 
federal government spends taxpayer dollars.”34 The GAO’s duty to 
oversee and investigate is expressed through its power to issue legal 
decisions and opinions regarding government agencies like the VA. 
Relevant here, these legal decisions and opinions sometimes 
manifest in the form of bid protest rulings.35 These rulings, however, 
are not binding upon an agency; they are merely recommendations, 
which the agency can then choose to follow or disregard.36 It is 
important to note that, despite the optional nature of these 
recommendations, “from 1997–2012, the GAO issued 5,703 merit 
decisions and sustained 1099 protests; during that period, an agency 
disregarded the GAO’s recommendation only ten times.”37 In 
response to the VA’s position that it was not required to utilize the 
Rule of Two in instances nearly identical to those in Kingdomware, 
“the [GAO] . . . sustained more than seventeen protests,” and the VA 
refused to follow every one of them.38 
Although the VA was previously within its rights as an agency to 
disregard the GAO’s recommendations, this is no longer the case. 
33. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 754 F.3d 923, 929 (Fed. Cir.
2014), rev’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016). 
34. About GAO, GAO, http://www.gao.gov/about/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
35. See id.
36. Kingdomware, 754 F.3d at 936 (“Although agencies often follow GAO
recommendations in bid protest decisions ‘given the GAO’s long experience and 
special expertise in such . . . matters,’ . . . these recommendations are not binding 
on an agency.” (quoting CMS Contract Mgmt. Servs. v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 745 
F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert denied sub nom. United States v. CMS Contract 
Mgmt. Servs., 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015))); see Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 
644, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that agencies are not compelled to follow 
recommendations from the Comptroller General). 
37. CMS, 745 F.3d at 1384–85.
38. Kingdomware, 754 F.3d at 936; see Letter from Lynn H. Gibson, Gen. Couns.
for the GAO, to Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, Cong. Committee Chairman, et al. (Nov. 13, 
2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/649957.pdf. 
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The Rule of Two is the statutory provision at the core of the 
controversy in Kingdomware, and it is now mandatory.39 
D. The Rule of Two 
The Rule of Two is a term commonly used to describe a 
particular statutory provision that establishes government 
procurement set-asides and restricts competitive bidding.40 This 
standard, which first appeared within the FAR in 1984,41 requires a 
government contracting officer to conduct market research to 
determine if two or more contractors, who have been designated as 
disadvantaged concerns,42 are capable of fulfilling the contract in 
question. If such contractors are reasonably likely to bid, and they 
can complete the procurement at a fair and reasonable price that 
offers the best value to the United States, then the officer must 
restrict the bidding process to those contractors.43 Although the FAR 
statement of purpose instructs that “[c]ontracting officers shall 
39. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1979 (2016)
(“[W]e do not defer to the agency when the statute is unambiguous.”). 
40. See generally Steven W. Feldman & Raymond Fioravanti, Contract Dispute or
Bid Protest? The Delex Systems Dilemma, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 483 (2010). 
41. 48 C.F.R. § 19.502-2(b) (2016).
The contracting officer shall set aside any acquisition over $150,000 for 
small business participation when there is a reasonable expectation 
that— 
(1) Offers will be obtained from at least two responsible small 
business concerns offering the products of different small business 
concerns . . . ; and 
(2) Award will be made at fair market prices. 
Id. A substantially similar provision was previously included in the Defense 
Acquisition Regulation and the NASA Procurement Regulation. Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) “Rule of Two”; Requirements for Setting Aside Acquisitions for 
Small Business, 49 Fed. Reg. 40,135, 40,135 (Oct. 12, 1984). 
42. These “concerns” include SDVOSBs; VOSBs; 8(a) small businesses, which
encompasses socially and economically disadvantaged groups; EDWOSBs; WOSBs; 
HUBZone concerns; and local firms during a major disaster or emergency. See Social 
Disadvantage Eligibility, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/contracting 
/government-contracting-programs/8a-business-development-program/eligibility  
-requirements/social-disadvantage-eligibility (last visited Mar. 30, 2017); see also 
Government Contracting Programs, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov 
/contracting/government-contracting-programs (last visited Mar. 30, 2017). 
43. 48 C.F.R. § 19.502-2(b) (2016).
8
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provide for full and open competition,”44 this requirement is 
exempted by § 6.203.45 
The Rule of Two actually predates the FAR.46 Leading up to the 
promulgation of the FAR, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
sought comments on the rule’s inclusion within the new 
regulation.47 Years earlier, in an effort to encourage the utilization 
and growth of small businesses, Congress mandated certain annual 
goals within the Small Business Act (SBA).48 As a benchmark, the 
original goal for an agency contracting with veteran small business 
concerns was “established at not less than 3 percent of the total value 
of all prime contract awards for each fiscal year.”49 The inclusion of 
the Rule of Two, therefore, is a mechanism that serves to meet these 
goals.50 The underlying controversy in Kingdomware hinged on just 
such a Rule of Two provision, which was included in the Veterans 
Act of 2006.51 
44. 48 C.F.R. § 6.101(b) (2014).
45. 48 C.F.R. § 6.203(a) (2016).
46. Delex Sys., Inc., B-400403, 2008 WL 4570635, at *6 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 8,
2008). 
47. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) “Rule of Two”; Requirements for
Setting Aside Acquisitions for Small Business, 49 Fed. Reg. 40,135, 40,135 (Oct. 12, 
1984). 
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(1)(B) (2016).
Each agency shall have an annual goal that presents, for that agency, the 
maximum practicable opportunity for small business concerns, small 
business concerns owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans, 
qualified HUBZone small business concerns, small business concerns 
owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals, and small business concerns owned and controlled by 
women to participate in the performance of contracts let by such agency. 
Id. 
49. Id. § 644(g)(1)(A)(i).
50. See 48 C.F.R. § 6.203(a) (“To fulfill the statutory requirements relating to
small business concerns, contracting officers may set aside solicitations to allow only 
such business concerns to compete.”). 
51. See 38 U.S.C. § 8127(d) (2012).
[A] contracting officer of the Department shall award contracts on the 
basis of competition restricted to small business concerns owned and 
controlled by veterans if the contracting officer has a reasonable 
expectation that two or more small business concerns owned and 
controlled by veterans will submit offers and that the award can be made 
at a fair and reasonable price that offers best value to the United States. 
Id. 
9
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E. The Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act 
of 2006 
Congress enacted the Veterans Act of 2006 in response to the 
Federal Government’s continuous failure to meet the annual goals 
for contracting with SDVOSBs, 52 which were established seven years 
earlier in the Veterans Entrepreneurship and Small Business 
Development Act.53 As noted, the Veterans Act of 2006 included the 
Rule of Two provision that later became the subject of the 
controversy in Kingdomware.54 While the Rule of Two itself does not 
contain language limiting the application of set-asides to VA 
procurements made through non-FSS contracts, “[i]n finalizing its 
regulations meant to implement the Act, the [VA] stated in a 
preamble that § 8127’s procedures ‘do not apply to [Federal Supply 
Schedule] task or delivery orders.’”55 
The VA’s position regarding the applicability of the Rule of Two 
to FSS procurements is one of the most critical aspects of the 
controversy underpinning Kingdomware. As previously stated, the VA 
was brought before the GAO on numerous bid protests regarding 
this very issue.56 Two such GAO bid protest rulings, Delex Systems57 
and Aldevra,58 are fundamental to understanding the tension and 
confusion that was building between United States agencies, 
specifically the VA and the GAO, and veteran-owned government 
contractors shortly before Kingdomware. This Note will now delve 
briefly into the relevant facts and issues presented by these two 
protests. 
52. Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-461, §§ 502–03, 120 Stat. 3403, 3431–36 (2006). 
53. 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(1)(A)(ii); Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 1969, 1973 (2016). 
54. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
55. Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. at 1974 (quoting VA Acquisition Regulation, 74
Fed. Reg. 64,619, 64,624 (2009)); see VA Acquisition Regulation, 74 Fed. Reg. at 
64,626 (“VA will continue to follow GSA guidance regarding applicability of 48 CFR 
part 19 of the FAR, Small Business Programs, which states that set-asides do not 
apply to FAR part 8 FSS acquisitions.”). 
56. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
57. Delex Sys., Inc., B-400403, 2008 WL 4570635 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 8, 2008).
58. Aldevra, B-405271 et al., 2011 WL 4826148 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 11, 2011).
10
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 6
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss3/6
678 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:3 
F. Delex Systems and Aldevra Bid Protests 
1. Delex Systems
The GAO decision in Delex Systems actually arose from a 2008 bid 
protest by Delex Systems, Inc. against the Navy, not the VA.59 The 
protest that the GAO sustained, however, was nearly identical to the 
controversy in Kingdomware.60 
The threshold question in Delex Systems was whether the Navy 
was required to apply the set-aside provisions of § 19.502-2(b) of the 
FAR—the Rule of Two—when soliciting multiple-award 
procurements61 through the FSS.62 The Navy argued that its 
obligation to follow FAR § 19.5 was based solely on FAR § 6.203(c), 
which “requires contracting agencies to follow FAR Subpart 19.5.”63 
The Navy then pointed to FAR § 16.505(b)(1)(ii), which states that 
“the competition requirement in [FAR] Part 6 do[es] not apply to 
the ordering process.”64 Therefore, if the Navy is not required to 
follow FAR Part 6, it would not be required to follow FAR Subpart 
19.5, which in turn frees it from complying with the Rule of Two 
provision when placing orders through the FSS.65 Additionally, the 
Navy asserted that Congress had “never indicated that the small 
business set-aside requirements apply to the placement of task and 
delivery orders, despite numerous opportunities to do so”; therefore, 
59. Delex Sys., 2008 WL 4570635, at *1.
60. Both Delex Systems and Kingdomware dealt with issues concerning the Rule
of Two and a government agency’s refusal to limit the competitive bidding process 
with respect to procurements made through the FSS ordering process. 
61. “A multiple-award contract is a type of indefinite-quantity contract which is
awarded to several contractors from a single solicitation. Delivery of supplies, or 
performance of services, is then made via an individual delivery/task order placed 
with one of the contractors pursuant to procedures established in the contract.” 
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, Multiple-Award Contracts and Governmentwide Acquisition 
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the set-aside requirements do not apply to FSS ordering.66 The GAO 
disagreed on all counts.67 
First, the GAO reminded the Navy that all of the provisions in 
question were statutory in nature and that each one was enacted in 
order to implement the requirements of other acts.68 Next, the GAO 
poked a significant hole in the Navy’s argument that 
§ 16.505(b)(1)(ii) of the FAR carves out an exception for task and
delivery orders through the FSS by allowing the agency to disregard 
Part 6 of the FAR and, by extension, the Rule of Two.69 The GAO 
concluded that the Navy was “overread[ing] the provision,” because 
“[w]hen an agency is placing task and delivery orders under 
multiple-award contracts, it cannot, by definition, hold a full and 
open competition as described by FAR Part 6.”70 It therefore stands 
to reason that, when reading FAR § 16.505(b)(1)(ii) literally, the 
provision stating that “[t]he competition requirements in Part 6 and 
the policies in Subpart 15.3 do not apply to the ordering process” 
means exactly what the plain language says: the competition 
requirements of Part 6 do not apply to ordering.71 In light of this 
seemingly unambiguous language, there was no reason to infer that 
“exemption from the requirements of full and open competition . . . 
can exempt agencies from the requirements of [the Rule of Two] 
when placing orders.”72 Finally, the GAO pointed to § 816 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006,73 which 
“required the Secretary of Defense to issue guidance on the use of 
[the cascading set-aside clause] for assessing offers for contracts and 
task and delivery orders.”74 To the GAO, this provision was clear 
66. Id. at *6.
67. See id. at *4–6 (disagreeing with both arguments).
68. Id. at *4–5.




73. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
163, § 816, 119 Stat. 3136, 3382 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2305). 
74. Delex Sys., 2008 WL 4570635, at *6; Pub. L. No. 109-163.
We note in particular that this enactment prescribes a prohibition on 
the use of such schemes unless a contracting officer has “conducted 
market research in accordance with part 10 of the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation in order to determine whether or not a sufficient number of 
qualified small businesses are available to justify limiting competition for 
the award of such contract or task or delivery order under applicable law 
12
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evidence that Congress had indeed “recognize[d] the possibility of 
limiting competition for task and delivery orders to small businesses 
when there is a sufficient number of small businesses to justify doing 
so.”75 Based primarily on these conclusions, the GAO sustained 
Delex’s protest and recommended that the Navy reevaluate its 
practices in light of the decision.76 
While the GAO’s decision in Delex Systems was not binding upon 
the Navy, the Navy chose to follow the recommendation. This 
acceptance is in contrast with the VA’s decision to disregard the 
GAO’s recommendation in Aldevra, a decision that helped set the 
stage for the dispute in Kingdomware. 
2. Aldevra
Aldevra was an SDVOSB concern that protested the VA’s 
issuance of solicitations for a tilting skillet/braising pan, three 
countertop electric griddles, and a food slicer in 2011.77 Similar to 
the petitioner in Delex Systems, Aldevra claimed that a government 
agency, the VA, had failed to comply with the applicable statutes by 
not determining if the bidding for these procurements should be 
limited by the Rule of Two.78 The GAO again sustained the protest.79 
The issue in Aldevra was identical to that in Delex Systems: 
“whether the [agency] is required to conduct market research to 
determine if the procurements should be set aside for [small 
business] concerns before using the FSS.”80 The VA, however, came 
and regulations.” 
Delex Sys., 2008 WL 4570635, at *6 (quoting National Defense Authorization Act, 
§ 816(b)(1)).
75. Delex Sys., 2008 WL 4570635, at *6.
76. Id. Further adding to the confusion of this area of law, in 2014 the GAO
actually overturned its decision in Delex Systems, citing a change in the statutory 
language of FAR § 19.502-4. See Edmond Sci. Co., B-410179 et al., 2014 WL 6199127, 
at *6 n.10 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 12, 2014) (“[T]he holding in Delex has been 
superceded by the passage of section 1331 of the Small Business Jobs Act . . . .”). For 
further discussion of this strange outcome, see Steven Koprince, Task Orders: Small 
Business Set-Asides Not Required, Says GAO, SMALLGOVCON (Nov. 25, 2014), 
http://smallgovcon.com/gaobidprotests/task-orders-small-business-set-asides-not   
-required-says-gao/. 
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prepared with a whole new set of arguments that the GAO rejected 
in turn. 
First, the VA asserted that it had “discretion to determine 
whether to meet its requirements through the FSS before procuring 
from other sources—such as SDVOSBs or VOSBs.”81 Second, the VA 
claimed that FAR § 8.404(a) explicitly provided that FAR Part 19 was 
inapplicable to FSS acquisitions, including FAR subpart 19.14, which 
was “the only subpart of FAR part 19 that address[ed] set-asides for 
SDVOSBs.”82 Again, the GAO disagreed.83 
On the first point, the GAO concluded that there was no actual 
basis in the various statutes that provided the VA with discretion of 
the type it had asserted.84 In fact, the plain language was 
“unequivocal” that it did not have such discretion.85 On the second 
point, the GAO reminded the VA that FAR subpart 19.14 was meant 
to implement the statutory requirements of the Veterans Benefit Act 
of 2003.86 FAR subpart 19.14 applies government-wide, whereas the 
Veterans Act of 2006 “applies only to VA procurements.”87 While the 
language of the Veterans Benefit Act of 2003 was permissive with 
regard to applying the Rule of Two,88 the 2006 Veterans Act had 
81. Id. at *2.
82. Id. at *3.
83. Id. at *3–6.
84. Id. at *2.
85. Id.
We see nothing in the VA Act or the [Veterans Administration 
Acquisition Regulation] that provides the agency with discretion to 
conduct a procurement under FSS procedures without first determining 
whether the acquisition should be set aside for SDVOSBs. The provisions 
of both the VA Act and the VAAR are unequivocal; the VA “shall” award 
contracts on the basis of competition restricted to SDVOSBs where there 
is a reasonable expectation that two or more SDVOSBs will submit offers 
and award can be made at a fair and reasonable price. 
Id. 
86. Id. at *5; see FAR § 19.1402.
87. Aldevra, 2011 WL 4826148, at *3; see 38 U.S.C. §§ 8127–28 (2006); Angelica
Textile Servs., Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 208, 222 (2010). 
88. Aldevra, 2011 WL 4826148, at *4 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 657f(b) (2006)) (“In
accordance with this section, a contracting officer may award contracts on the basis 
of competition restricted to small business concerns owned and controlled by 
service-disabled veterans if the contracting officer has a reasonable expectation that 
not less than 2 small business concerns owned and controlled by service-disabled 
veterans will submit offers and that the award can be made at a fair market price.” 
(emphasis added)). 
14
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 6
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss3/6
682 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:3 
mandatory language that required the VA to apply the Rule of Two.89 
Therefore, the VA’s argument on this point was invalid, because the 
FAR language exempting the FSS did not apply to the statute at issue 
in the protest.90 
Consistent with this reasoning, the GAO recommended that the 
VA cancel the solicitations in question, conduct the proper market 
research analysis as required by the Rule of Two, and resolicit the 
procurements consistent with that analysis.91 The VA refused to 
follow this recommendation.92 It was this exact behavior by the VA, 
of refusing to accept the recommendations of the GAO, which led 
to the facts in Kingdomware now explored in detail. 
III. THE KINGDOMWARE TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. UNITED STATES
DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedure 
In early 2012, the VA initiated procurement activity in order to 
install an Emergency Notification Service at four of its medical 
centers.93 To that end, the VA solicited a price quotation from a 
nonveteran-owned business through the FSS.94 Finding the price 
favorable, the VA accepted the terms and entered into an agreement 
with that business.95 Kingdomware challenged the award, and it had 
standing as a company owned by an Army veteran who was 
permanently disabled by an injury he sustained while serving in 




92. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-162SP, GAO BID PROTEST 
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 (2012), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/649957.pdf. 
93. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1974 (2016).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1974–75.
96. Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Unanimous Court Hands Victory to Veterans in
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1. The GAO Bid Protest
In this challenge, argued in front of the GAO, Kingdomware 
contended, as Aldevra had before it,97 that the VA was barred from 
awarding the procurement until it had conducted market research 
into the ability of SDVOSBs to perform the contract as required by 
§ 8127’s Rule of Two.98 The GAO’s nonbinding determination was
“that the [VA’s] failure to employ the Rule of Two was unlawful,” 
and the agency therefore “recommended that the [VA] conduct 
market research to determine whether there were two veteran-
owned businesses that could fulfill the procurement.”99 The VA 
declined to follow the GAO’s ruling,100 reiterating its position that 
the Rule of Two did not apply to FSS procurements.101 
2. The Federal Court of Claims Ruling
With no further recourse to be had through the GAO, 
Kingdomware filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking 
97. See Aldevra, B-406205, 2012 WL 860813, at *1 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 14, 2012).
98. Kingdomware Techs., B-406507, 2012 WL 1942256 (Comp. Gen. May 30,
2012). 
99. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1975 (2016).
Consistent with our decision in Aldevra . . . we conclude that the VA Act 
required the agency to consider whether this acquisition should have 
been set aside for SDVOSB (or VOSB) concerns. Further, on the record 
presented, it appears that such set-aside should have occurred. 
Accordingly, we sustain Kingdomware’s protest. 
Kingdomware., 2012 WL 1942256, at *2. 
 100. “GAO decisions are not binding authority, but may be ‘instructive in the 
area of bid protests.’” Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 226, 
244 n.2 (2012) (citing Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1038 n.4 
(Fed. Cir. 2009)), aff’d, 754 F.3d 923 (Fed. Cir. 2014), rev’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 
1969. 
The Competition in Contracting Act (“CICA”) grants the Comptroller 
General of GAO authority in a bid protest (1) to determine whether a 
contracting agency’s solicitation or award of contract is in violation of a 
procurement statute or regulation, and (2) to recommend that the 
agency take corrective action if the agency did not comply with the 
statute or regulation. 
Jacobs Tech. Inc. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 186, 196 n.21 (2011) (citing 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3554(b)(1)).
101. Kingdomware, 2012 WL 1942256, at *2; see Aldevra, 2012 WL 860813, at *2.
16
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declaratory and injunctive relief.102 Instead, relying on the statutory 
interpretation framework established in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,103 the Court of Federal Claims 
granted summary judgment to the VA.104 
Using the Chevron framework, the Court of Federal Claims first 
found ambiguity in § 8127(d).105 Moving to the second step in the 
Chevron analysis, the court then declared that the VA’s interpretation 
(that the Veterans Act did not apply to the FSS) was reasonable and 
worthy of deference.106 The court made its decision at least in part 
due to the VA’s consistent interpretation, which “reflects a uniform 
approach on the part of the agency.”107 Additionally, the court held 
that the VA’s interpretation was “not directly in conflict with the Act 
. . . , which [is] silent on the role of the FSS in meeting the goals set 
by the Secretary,” or “with the legislative history of the Act, which 
expresses the intent that VA retain ‘options’ to award contracts to 
SDVOSBs and VOSBs.”108 The court affirmed “that VA would 
‘exercise reasonable judgment’ in meeting the Act’s set-aside goals 
alongside VA’s other small business goal obligations.”109 Finally, the 
102. Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. at 1975. 
103. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end 
of the matter. . . . If, however, the court determines Congress has not 
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not 
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary 
in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute 
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for 
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute. 
Id. at 842–43. 
104. Kingdomware, 107 Fed. Cl. at 244. 
 105. Id. at 241 (“[T]he goal-setting nature of the statute clouds the clarity 
plaintiff would attribute to the phrase ‘shall award’ in subsection (d) of the Act, and 
renders the Act ambiguous as to its application to other procurement vehicles, such 
as the FSS.”). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 243–44 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 
(2001)). 
108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 244 (describing the contracting guidelines that the legislation 
provides for the VA). 
VA would be allowed to award non-competitive contracts to small 
businesses owned and controlled by veterans when the amount of the 
17
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court concluded, “VA’s interpretation is consistent with the 
traditional relationship between set-asides and the FSS found in the 
FAR . . . .”110 
3. The Federal Circuit Majority Opinion
Kingdomware then appealed to the Federal Circuit, which in 
turn affirmed the lower court’s ruling by a divided panel.111 The 
majority agreed with the lower court that the proper analysis was to 
follow the two-step framework of Chevron regarding statutory 
interpretation.112 This time, however, the review ended at the first 
step; the court held that Congress was not silent.113 In fact, it did 
speak directly to the question, and since it perceived “no ambiguity 
in § 8127,” that was, according to Chevron, “the end of the matter, for 
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”114 
The majority was not persuaded by Kingdomware’s argument 
that the statutory change in language from “may” to “shall” between 
the 2003 and 2006 versions of § 8127(d) of the Veterans Act 
implicated “the canon of construction that a change in legislative 
language generally gives rise to a presumption that Congress 
contract is below the simplified acquisition threshold as defined in 
section 4 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. s 
403). Further, contracting officers would be allowed, but not required, 
to award sole source contracts to small businesses owned and controlled 
by veterans to meet the annual goal set by the Secretary for contracts 
above the simplified acquisition threshold but below $5,000,000. 
Contracting officers would retain the option to restrict competition to small 
businesses owned and controlled by veterans if the contracting officer has an 
expectation that two or more such businesses owned by veterans will 
submit offers for the contract including all contracts exceeding 
$5,000,000. 
Id. at 240 (quoting 152 CONG. REC. S11609, S11615 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2006) (Joint 
Explanatory Statement as read into the record)). 
110. Id. at 244. 
 111. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 754 F.3d 923, 934 (Fed. Cir. 
2014), rev’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016). 
112. See id. at 930 (“Here, since there are no factual or mixed factual and legal 
issues, and the only question is one of statutory construction, we apply the Chevron 
standard.”). 
113. See id. at 931. 
 114. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842–43 (1984)). 
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intended to change the meaning of the law.”115 In fact, the panel 
reasoned, Kingdomware was unreasonable in its interpretation of 
the Act.116 On the one hand it was assigning “dispositive weight to 
the command term ‘shall,’” but on the other it was ignoring the 
“additional statutory language stating that this mandate [was] ‘for 
purposes of meeting the goals under subsection (a).’”117 After all, 
the panel reasoned, Congress had enacted the statute “out of 
frustration with the failure of agencies Government-wide to achieve 
the aspirational goals of 3% for SDVOSBs.”118 Since interpreting 
these prefatory words as mere “surplusage” would violate “a bedrock 
principle of statutory interpretation” and would lead to illogical 
outcomes, the panel reasoned that the words must be given 
meaning.119 If the panel ruled against the VA it would be requiring 
the agency “to conduct a Rule of Two analysis for every contract 
irrespective of the goals set under subsection (a),” making the goal 
provision itself “superfluous.”120 
The panel acknowledged the VA’s argument that interpreting 
the statutory language as mandatory would not only create 
inefficiencies for the agency, but also undermine the purpose of the 
Act by preventing the VA from meeting its goals with regard to other 
small businesses—an outcome apparently conflicting with the 
legislators’ anticipated outcome.121 Therefore, the panel held that 
the VA “need not perform a VOSB Rule of Two analysis for every 
contract, as long as the goals set under subsection (a) are met.”122 
Despite the Federal Circuit’s incorrect application of the canons 
of statutory interpretation, the reasoning was not completely off 
base. As the panel predicted, the VA must now grapple with the very 
115. Id. at 931–34. 
116. Id. at 933. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 934. 
119. Id. at 933 (citing Qi-Zhuo v. Meissner, 70 F.3d 136, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 934 (“Congress anticipated that with the contracting tools provided 
in § 8127, the VA would be able to ‘meet, if not exceed’ its contracting goals, . . . 
while at the same time fulfilling the goals it has set for other small business entities.” 
(citation omitted)). “The goals for veteran and service-disabled veteran owned 
businesses are not in any way intended to prevent attainment of other set-aside 
goals.” Id. (quoting 152 CONG. REC. S11609–03, S11616). 
122. Id. 
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real outcomes resulting from the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Kingdomware.123 
4. The Federal Circuit Dissent 
Judge Reyna, the lone dissent throughout the entire legal 
progression of Kingdomware, argued for a much stricter textual 
analysis than that of the Federal Circuit majority.124 Rather than 
trying to ascertain the intent of Congress, or “choosing our preferred 
interpretation from among a range of potentially plausible, but likely 
inaccurate, interpretations of a statute,” Judge Reyna argued that the 
court should find in favor of Kingdomware using a plain language 
approach.125 In fact, Judge Reyna posited, “[t]he statutory provision 
at issue could not be clearer. It provides that contracting officers 
‘shall award contracts’ on the basis of restricted competition 
whenever the contracting officer has a reasonable expectation that 
the Rule of Two will be satisfied.”126 
Judge Reyna proceeded to scold the majority for acting as policy 
maker and, in doing so, losing sight of its “duty to enforce the proper 
interpretation of the statute regardless of [their] policy views.”127 As 
Kingdomware had unsuccessfully argued, the use of “shall award” in 
§ 8127(d) is mandatory language when compared to the
discretionary language of “may use” and “may award” present in 
§§ 8127(b) and (c).128 Judge Reyna found that “when the same 
statute uses both ‘may’ and ‘shall,’ the normal inference is that each 
is used in its usual sense and that the former is permissive, the latter 
mandatory.”129 
Judge Reyna then took note of the majority’s total disregard for 
the GAO’s construction of the statute and its numerous 
recommendations that the VA comply with § 8127(d).130 He went on 
123. See infra Sections IV.A.3–4. 
124. Kingdomware, 754 F.3d at 934–35 (Reyna, J., dissenting). 
125. Id. (“The plain language of the 2006 Veterans Act unambiguously requires 
VA contracting officers to conduct a Rule of Two analysis in every acquisition and 
does not exempt task or delivery orders under the [FSS].”). 
126. Id. at 935. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 936 (citing Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947); Ky., Educ. 
Cabinet, Dep’t for the Blind v. United States, 424 F.3d 1222, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 130. Kingdomware, 754 F.3d at 936; see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra 
note 92, at 5. 
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to explain how the words that served as the foundation for the 
majority’s arguments—”for purposes of meeting the goals under 
subsection (a)”—are prefatory in nature, and it was therefore 
inappropriate to construe them as having any limiting effect on the 
operative clause.131 Additionally, he contended that the majority’s 
fear that a mandatory Rule of Two provision would “obviate the goal-
setting provision” was misguided since the goals are merely 
“aspirations, not destinations.”132 These arguments are logically 
sound and represent a win for statutory interpretation.133 
B. Justice Thomas’s Opinion 
Justice Thomas expressed his approval for Reyna’s dissent by 
echoing his textual arguments. In a unanimous 8-0 opinion, the 
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings 
consistent with that result.134 In a surprisingly non-contentious 
ruling, given the lower court rulings and the decade long battle 
between the VA and disadvantaged concerns both in court and in 
front of the GAO, Justice Thomas, speaking for the entire Court, 
held “that § 8127(d) unambiguously requires the [VA] to use the 
Rule of Two before contracting under the competitive 
procedures.”135 
The Court borrowed many of Judge Reyna’s arguments in his 
lower court dissent to explain its reasoning. First, the Court agreed 
with the Federal Circuit panel’s overall finding that § 8127(d) is 
unambiguous.136 However, that is where the two opinions diverge. 
The Court adopted a narrow interpretation of the text, reiterating 
Judge Reyna’s position that “Congress’ use of the word ‘shall’ 
demonstrates that § 8127(d) mandates the use of the Rule of Two in 
all contracting before using competitive procedures. Unlike the 
word ‘may,’ which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’ usually 
connotes a requirement.”137 This refreshingly straightforward 
131. Kingdomware, 754 F.3d at 936–38. 
132. Id. at 938, 940. 
133. See infra Section IV.A.1. 
134. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1979 (2016). 
135. Id. at 1976. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 1977. 
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interpretation of the plain meaning of the statutory provision makes 
the lower court’s reasoning look like it was grasping at straws. 
Following this logic, Justice Thomas went on to point out 
another flaw in the Federal Circuit panel’s analysis. While the lower 
court focused on the prefatory language, “[f]or the purpose of 
meeting the goals under [§ 8127(a)],” it failed to address the 
presence of the exact same phrase in the two subparts that utilize the 
permissive “may.”138 Justice Thomas illustrated that “[i]f the Federal 
Circuit’s understanding of § 8127(d)’s prefatory clause were correct, 
then §§ 8127(b) and (c), which also contain [the same clause], 
would cease to apply once the [VA] meets the Secretary’s goal, and 
the [VA] would be required to return to competitive bidding.”139 
This type of disparate result could not be allowed to stand. 
The Court also addressed the argument of the lower court and 
the VA that the Court should defer to the agency based on the 
framework in Chevron.140 This argument fails because Chevron’s 
deference is only required when a statute is ambiguous, which this 
one is not.141 In this way, the Court circumvented the Chevron 
framework and concluded that the VA was not deserving of judicial 
deference in this case. 
In ruling that the statute must be applied based on its plain 
meaning, as amended by the legislature, rather than based on some 
hypothetical legislative intent that must be ascertained through 
extensive investigation and assumptions, the Court came to the 
correct legal conclusion. This sensible reading of the statute is truly 
a win for statutory interpretation, and collaterally for VOSBs as well, 
but the consequences of making the right decision will perhaps be 
much more problematic than the Court would like to admit.142 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF KINGDOMWARE AND AFFIRMATIVE SOLUTIONS
To understand the consequences of Kingdomware, it is helpful to
tally the winners and losers. While the Supreme Court was correct in 
its interpretation of the relevant statutes and its application of 
controlling legal precedent, representing a huge win for veterans, its 
ruling in Kingdomware will have negative consequences far beyond 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 1978. 
140. Id. at 1979. 
141. Id. at 1978. 
142. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
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the surface-level victory for one disadvantaged concern. This Note 
will explain how the Court’s mandate creates chaos and 
inefficiencies across governmental agencies, which must now 
scramble to adjust their own practices or face litigation. This 
decision will have potentially devastating effects on nonveteran 
disadvantaged concerns that stand to lose government contracts as a 
result. In conclusion, this Note briefly examines the legislative intent 
behind the Veteran’s Act and proposes a statutory change consistent 
with that intent that could solve some of the issues outlined. 
A. The Winners and Losers of Kingdomware 
1. A Win for Statutory Interpretation
With the passing of the late Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas is now 
the leading originalist on the Supreme Court and has proven himself 
to be something of a textual crusader during his twenty-five years on 
the bench.143 In fact, Justice Thomas may be the Supreme Court 
Justice who most often relies on the canons of statutory construction 
in his decisions.144 Therefore, it is certainly fitting that Justice 
Thomas authored the majority opinion in Kingdomware—a clear win 
for the canons. 
In Kingdomware, Justice Thomas stayed true to his prior rulings 
when he relied on the unambiguous plain meaning of § 8127’s 
text.145 Although “[c]anons of construction need not be 
 143. See Judge H. Brent McKnight, The Emerging Contours of Justice Thomas’s 
Textualism, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 365, 365–66 (2000); Hon. David B. Sentelle, 
Remarks—Justice Thomas, the Person, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 482, 490–91 (2009); Ralph 
Rossum, Understanding Clarence Thomas: The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Restoration, 
L. & LIBERTY (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum 
/understanding-clarence-thomas-the-jurisprudence-of-constitutional-restoration/. 
 144. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive 
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 45–46 (2005). 
 145. Compare Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. at 1976–77, with Conn. Nat. Bank v. 
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“[C]anons of construction are no more than 
rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation, and in 
interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before 
all others. We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature 
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the 
words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial 
inquiry is complete.’” (Thomas, J., writing for the majority) (citations omitted)). 
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conclusive,”146 the Court has stated that the plain meaning of a 
statute “necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ . . . 
intent.”147 Looking no further than the plain meaning of § 8127’s 
text is consistent with the Court’s precedent and reinforces 
important principles of statutory interpretation. 
In focusing on the statutory language, the Court avoided falling 
into the same trap as the lower courts in Kingdomware.148 Those 
courts expended significant energy rummaging about in 
congressional testimony in search of other potential or intended 
meanings that were ultimately incorrect.149 
2. A Win for Veterans
The mandate in Kingdomware is an indisputable win for 
SDVOSBs and VOSBs across America.150 As a direct result of the 
Court’s ruling, VOSBs stand to receive an enormous volume of new 
VA contracts—opportunities that will reap extreme monetary 
benefits.151 If other government agencies follow suit by mandating 
146. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001). 
147. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993). 
148. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. 
149. See Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner 
at 10–11, Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (No. 14-916), 2015 WL 5026167 (“The VA 
and the Federal Circuit have both cited to a single line in the legislative history that 
they claim shows that the change from ‘may’ to ‘shall’ was intended to refer to the 
VA’s goals, not the Veterans Rule of Two analysis . . . . However, that reference to 
‘goals’ has been taken out of context.”). 
 150. A mere perusal of the amicus curiae briefs filed in support of Kingdomware 
show that veterans organizations across the spectrum view the Court’s holding to be 
a victory for veterans. See, e.g., Brief for the Am. Legion as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (No. 14-916), 2015 WL 5026168; Brief for 
Ir. and Afg. Veterans of Am. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Kingdomware, 
136 S. Ct. 1969 (No. 14-916), 2015 WL 5026170; Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Veteran 
Small Bus. Coal. et al. in Support of Petitioner, Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (No. 
14-916), 2015 WL 5026169; Brief of Amici Curiae Paralyzed Veterans of Am., Viet. 
Veterans Ass’n, The Military Officers Ass’n of Am. & The Nat’l Veterans Legal Servs. 
Program in Support of Petitioner, Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (No. 14-916), 2015 
WL 5093217. 
 151. As recently as 2015, the “Total Small Business Eligible Dollars” for the VA 
was over $20 billion. Prior to the decision in Kingdomware, VOSBs accounted for 
18.6% of this total, VOSBs accounted for 16.8%, small disadvantaged businesses 
accounted for 7.4%, WOSBs accounted for nearly 3%, HUBZone businesses 
accounted for 1.6%, and 8(a) businesses accounted for .2%, leaving the lion’s share 
for other small businesses. Small Business Goaling Report, Fiscal Year: 2015, FED. 
PROCUREMENT DATA SYS.—NEXT GENERATION, https://www.fpds.gov/downloads 
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Rule of Two analysis for all of their procurement contracts, either 
voluntarily or through litigation, as some are proposing,152 VOSBs 
could see their businesses grow exponentially.153 In light of the newly 
mandated priority of VOSBs in VA procurement, there is also a push 
for expanded efforts to train and develop VOSBs in order to meet 
the huge business demands that will inevitably follow the Court’s 
decision—an added benefit for small businesses that have previously 
struggled to attain large contracts due to their lack of training.154 
This type of training could go a long way towards dispelling the view 
held by some of the VA’s contracting officers that a small business is 
less capable than a larger business of completing a contract to the 
VA’s satisfaction, a belief that has led some of these officers to favor 
large contractors over smaller ones.155 Finally, the Kingdomware 
/top_requests/FPDSNG_SB_Goaling_FY_2015.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2017). 
Post-Kingdomware, VOSBs and SDVOSBs stand to receive a large portion of the 
nearly $13 billion in VA contracts that are currently awarded to other parties. Id. 
 152. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Michael Phipps, Managing Director, 
The Millennium Group Int’l LLC, at 1) (“The case also validated the Congressional 
practice of enhanced agency-specific Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small 
Business (SDVOSB) set-aside goal measures to supplement the Small Business Act. 
This shows other agencies the importance of implementing internal policies where 
buyers cannot stop looking for SDVOSB’s even after they meet their SDVOSB goals. 
The Committee should direct all agencies to implement such policies.”). 
 153. Total small business eligible dollars across government agencies topped 
$352 billion in 2015. See Small Business Goaling Report, Fiscal Year: 2015, supra note 
151. 
 154. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Michael Phipps, Managing Director, 
The Millennium Group Int’l LLC, at 3–6) (“[T]he Senate Small Business 
Committee should consider the research conducted by Professor Max Kidalov and 
his co-author Jennifer Lee . . . . The research highlights the need to create a growth 
pathway from low-dollar simplified acquisitions to more complex buys. The research 
also demonstrates that contracting officers have trouble deciding on when to use 
discretionary SDVOSB set-asides. For this reason, the research recommends a 
Business Development Program for SDVOSB’s, agency-specific or government-
wide.” (citing MAX V. KIDALOV & JENNIFER L. LEE, AN OPEN DOOR AND A LEG UP:
INCREASING SERVICE-DISABLED VETERAN-OWNED SMALL BUSINESS PARTICIPATION IN
DEFENSE, NAVY, AND MARINE CORPS CONTRACTING THROUGH SIMPLIFIED ACQUISITIONS 
(2015), http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47473/NPS-GSBPP-15 
-004.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)). 
 155. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Thomas J. Leney, Executive 
Director, Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Small and Disadvantaged 
Business Utilization, at 2) (“In addition, contracting officers and their program 
office customers need to have confidence that VOSBs can execute the contracts 
awarded to them. VA wants our contractors to be successful without unnecessary 
delays, higher costs, and added risks to VA’s mission. This is one reason why some 
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mandate forces the VA to at last embrace its duty to put “veterans 
first,” as Congress intended.156 
These outcomes are overwhelmingly positive for VOSBs, and 
they support the somewhat obvious conclusion that veterans are the 
biggest winners in Kingdomware. On the other hand, not all of the 
results flowing from the Court’s ruling in Kingdomware are positive. 
It stands to reason that if there are winners, then there must be losers 
as well, and this case is no different. 
3. A Loss for Efficiency
Governmental inefficiency is one negative consequence of the 
Court’s mandate in Kingdomware. Despite claims to the contrary by 
veterans,157 interested parties,158 and the Court,159 the Kingdomware 
decision will undoubtedly result in inefficiencies and confusion for 
personnel may perceive large business contractors as a safer choice, because they 
believe large firms’ internal quality assurance programs will mitigate these risks. In 
this view, small businesses may look like a riskier choice.”). 
 156. See Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 149, at 1 (“[T]he House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs and . . . the 
Subcommittee on Economic Opportunity . . . spearheaded the effort to ensure that 
veteran-owned small businesses would be first in line to compete for government 
contracts.” (emphasis added)). 
 157. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of LaTonya Barton, Employee, 
Business Operations, Kingdomware Technologies, Inc., at 3) (“By working with 
veterans, the VA can achieve the important objectives of the law while still 
maintaining an efficient procurement process. For example, the VA can already 
streamline the process for smaller contracts through existing authority to make sole 
source or noncompetitive awards.”). 
 158. See Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Veteran Small Bus. Coal. et al. in Support of 
Petitioner, supra note 150, at 21 (“Respecting Congress’s choice and upholding the 
statutory rights of veterans does not mean that VA purchasing will grind to a halt 
. . . .”).  
 159. See Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1978–79 
(2016) (“The Department maintains that FSS orders are only for simplified 
acquisitions, and that using the Rule of Two for these purchases will hamper 
mundane purchases . . . . But . . . the Department may continue to purchase items 
that cost less than the simplified acquisition threshold (currently $150,000) through 
the FSS, if the Department procures them from a veteran-owned small business.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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the VA, as well as other government agencies,160 which must 
scramble to implement the newly minted mandate.161 
To its credit, the VA has seemingly taken this added burden in 
stride,162 perhaps cognizant of the negative perception of its 
stubborn refusal to accept the ultimately correct recommendations 
of the GAO163 or perhaps resigned to the binding judgment of the 
highest Court in the land.164 Regardless of its motivation, the VA and 
other agencies are forced to accept the Court’s ruling and must now 
forge ahead the best they can. To that end, the VA has already issued 
an internal policy memo apprising its employees of the changes that 
are to flow from the Kingdomware ruling and the possible effects the 
mandate will have on daily operations.165 
Despite these changes, there are still more administrative issues 
that the Court did not specifically address in its decision. The most 
 160. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of A. John Shoraka, Associate 
Administrator, Office of Government Contracting and Business Development, at 4) 
(“Since the Kingdomware decision is silent on the construction of the Small Business 
Act, it is unclear what impact the ruling has beyond VA and its use of the VA statute. 
SBA will be conferring with the Department of Justice, the SBPAC, GSA (as 
managers of the Federal Supply Schedules), the Federal Acquisition Regulatory 
Council, and others to discuss if any changes to regulations are needed.”). 
 161. Id. (statement of Thomas J. Leney, Executive Director, Department of 
Veterans Affairs Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization, at 1) 
(“[W]e have already taken action to address the Court’s recent decision. For 
example, we have modified VA’s Procurement Review Policy, issued by my office, to 
require the review of all procurements not set aside for VOSBs. We have also 
directed VA’s contracting officers to review all active procurements to determine 
whether VOSBs were appropriately considered in the market research.”). 
162. See id. at 1–2. (“VA will comply immediately with the Court’s decision . . . . 
[T]he Court’s decision is an opportunity for VA to improve our best practices.”). 
 163. See id. (statement of LaTonya Barton, Employee, Business Operations, 
Kingdomware Technologies, Inc., at 3) (“It is time for the VA to stop looking for 
loopholes and to redirect that energy into making the mandate work.”). 
 164. See id. (statement of Thomas J. Leney, Executive Director, Department of 
Veterans Affairs Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization, at 1) 
(“While VA’s previous policy was found to be consistent with the law by two 
subordinate Federal courts, Kingdomware represents a correction of our 
understanding of the Veterans First mandate.”). 
 165. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA’S APPROACH TO VETERANS FIRST
CONTRACTING POST-KINGDOMWARE (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.va.gov/osdbu 
/docs/vets-first-post-kingdomware-briefing-09-19-2016-v2.pdf (arguing that impacts 
of the Kingdomware decision include the administrative burden from updating 
policies, training personnel, and addressing a backlog of requests due to increased 
work load; an increase in the amount of verification applications; and increased 
significance of the vendor information pages). 
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obvious of these issues is the Court’s lack of direction as to what kind 
of market analysis the VA is required to perform under the Rule of 
Two.166 Based on its track record when it comes to discretionary 
decisions, the VA is not positioned to make this type of 
determination on its own. Therefore, the sole avenues for resolving 
this lack of direction are litigation or a legislative action. Legislative 
action is almost certainly the less contentious and more cost-effective 
resolution. In fact, this Note will later offer a proposed legislative 
action that will include a directive on this topic.167 
The VA has been fighting this mandate for nearly ten years. 
Based on the potential administrative burdens outlined in this 
section, it will continue to be a wrench in the gears of an already 
malfunctioning government machine.168 
4. A Loss for Equity 
Another negative consequence of the Court’s decision in 
Kingdomware is the required prioritization of veteran interests over 
those of every other disadvantaged concern. Since the VA must now 
consider VOSBs in virtually all procurement situations, it is likely that 
the increase in VOSB contracts will mean few, if any, contracts will 
be awarded to other disadvantaged concerns, such as WOSBs and 
HUBZone contractors.169 It is a shame that beneficial change for 
America’s veterans comes at the expense of several other historically 
disadvantaged groups of business owners, such as women and racial 
minorities. Ironically, supporters of Kingdomware have presented 
arguments in favor of a mandated priority for VOSBs, while 
simultaneously failing to see that the same arguments are now true 
of other disadvantaged concerns—some with even less market 
share.170 
 166. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Jonathan T. Williams, Partner, 
PilieroMazza PLLC, at 3) (“The Supreme Court explicitly declined to address how 
extensive the VA’s market research must be to satisfy its obligations under the Vets 
First mandate. Does the VA need to look only at FSS contract holders to determine 
if the Rule of Two is satisfied? Or, does the VA need to look outside FSS contract 
holders? The Supreme Court did not say, so Congress should step in with legislation 
to answer this question.”). 
167. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
168. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
169. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
170. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of LaTonya Barton, Employee, 
Business Operations, Kingdomware Technologies, Inc., at 2) (“[B]illions of dollars 
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Taking food out of the mouth of one disadvantaged concern to 
feed another does not seem equitable in the least, but that is the 
potential result of Kingdomware. Adding insult to injury, research 
shows that the new financial boon for VOSBs may not be shared 
equitably among all veteran contractors, meaning that some small 
nonveteran concerns will likely lose contracts to large repeat 
players.171 This outcome undermines the very purpose of § 8127, 
which is to encourage veterans and other disadvantaged concerns to 
pursue entrepreneurial and innovative endeavors in the form of 
small business government contracting. 
It is, however, possible to avoid some of these negative 
consequences of the Court’s decision in Kingdomware while 
simultaneously promoting the positive ones. This Note will now 
propose two legislative actions that aim to accomplish just that. 
B. Proposed Legislative Action 
1. Reforms for Procurements Going Forward
One of the negative consequences of Kingdomware is the 
potential for inefficiencies and confusion between government 
agencies that must now try to understand the Court’s ruling as it 
applies to them while also grappling with increased workloads 
created by newly mandated market analysis and extra training to 
ensure compliance with the changes.172 
Specifically, the VA will now face a huge influx of new 
applications to its vendor programs that must be processed, in 
addition to market research analysis that must be completed for each 
and every procurement in order to satisfy the Rule of Two.173 
have been steered away from veterans trying to establish and grow their businesses 
and feed their families. Many veterans are now out of business, some even having 
contemplated suicide, because there were no opportunities to contract with the 
VA.”). 
 171. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Michael Phipps, Managing Director, 
The Millennium Group Int’l LLC, at 4) (“The research conclusively demonstrates 
that the current SDVOSB Program supports a dwindling number of established 
firms. This is because the SDVOSB Program as currently designed is not effectively 
aligned to increase broad-based participation of SDVOSB firms as contractors.”); 
KIDALOV & LEE, supra note 154, at 90 (“The alumni population of the SDVOSB 
Program . . . receiving New Awards has been dwindling over the recent years.”). 
172. See supra Section IV.A.3. 
 173. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Michael Phipps, Managing Director, 
The Millennium Group Int’l LLC, at 4–5, 7). 
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Although it is not uncommon for new legislation or Supreme Court 
rulings to create additional work for government agencies, rarely are 
those agencies already struggling to meet their existing duties as is 
the case with the VA. It is therefore unsurprising that the agency 
cited inefficiency concerns while it argued so vehemently against the 
imposition of Rule of Two analysis on FSS orders.174 
Other agencies, such as the SBA, are also concerned about what 
the Court’s mandate means for them.175 SBA is, however, not the 
only agency that should be concerned. As shown in Delex Systems,176 
numerous government agencies deal in one way or another with 
contract set-asides and the Rule of Two. These agencies include the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the GSA, and 
NASA, amongst others.177 
To simplify the procurement process for government agencies 
and avoid the costly litigation that is likely to come if nothing is done 
soon,178 this Note proposes that Congress enact legislation to 
consolidate the FSS programs run by the VA and SBA. This action 
should resolve several issues that practitioners are witnessing as a 
result of the current inconsistencies between the two programs.179 
 174. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 15 (“Petitioner’s interpretation 
of Section 8127 would also produce significant waste and inefficiency.”). 
 175. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of A. John Shoraka, Associate 
Administrator, Office of Government Contracting and Business Development, at 4). 
176. See supra Section II.E.1. 
177. See Small Business Goaling Report, Fiscal Year: 2015, supra note 151. 
178. See Damien C. Specht & Rachael K. Plymale, Feature Comment: 
Kingdomware: Broader than SCOTUS Intended?, 58 No. 26 GOV’T CONTRACTOR 1, 4 
(“Whether the decision will lead to expansion of small business set-asides under 
GSA’s FSS is yet to be seen, but it has already been the topic of congressional 
hearings, and may soon be the topic of litigation.”). 
 179. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Jonathan T. Williams, Partner, 
PilieroMazza PLLC, at 3) (“The Kingdomware ruling is also another opportunity to 
ponder the wisdom of having two federal government procurement programs for 
VOSBs. The two programs, one run by the VA and the other by the SBA, are very 
similar but are not identical. Inconsistencies between the two programs have led to 
confusion and inefficiencies for the veteran contracting community and federal 
agencies. As an example, we represented one VOSB that was proposed for 
debarment by SBA because of the company’s ownership structure, which did not 
comply with the SBA’s VOSB rules but did satisfy the VA’s VOSB rules. Additionally, 
VOSBs have been forced to file bid protests with the GAO because of procuring 
officials who have applied the VA’s verification requirements to non-VA 
procurements. Contracting officers have sent SDVOSB protests on a non-VA 
contract to the VA, instead of the SBA. VA contracting officers have failed to forward 
size protests to the SBA, even though the SBA is the agency exclusively authorized 
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This Note also proposes that Congress ensure agency 
compliance with its intent to put veterans first by issuing guidance to 
all the involved agencies, explaining how Kingdomware applies to 
them and whether or not the Rule of Two is mandatory for that 
agency.180 If significant administrative burdens will be created due to 
these new mandates, then Congress should supply the agencies with 
the resources necessary to enact the procedures. Veterans will not 
benefit if granting them first priority for government contracts only 
mires the contracting agencies in administrative backlog, especially 
when the VA is already dealing with vast inefficiencies in the 
procurement process.181 These straightforward adjustments to the 
current contracting regime should result in a more efficient 
government and one that better serves its veterans. 
2. Changes to 38 U.S.C. § 8127
Besides making a sweeping change to synchronize procurement 
practices across agencies, Congress could improve the Rule of Two 
provision, contained within § 8127(d), that was at issue in 
Kingdomware. Although the Court made clear that the Rule of Two 
must be applied by the VA in all its procurement processes, as 
previously discussed, that ruling will have several unsavory 
consequences182 that could be avoided through a legislative action. 
to decide size status. And VOSBs that participate in SBA’s VOSB program may seek 
review of eligibility determinations before an administrative law judge at SBA’s 
Office of Hearings and Appeals, but VOSBs participating in the VA’s program 
cannot. There are other differences between the programs, all of which 
unnecessarily add to the veteran’s compliance burden and complicate the mission 
of increasing federal spending on VOSBs.”). 
 180. This Note finds no issue with Congress choosing to hold some agencies, 
such as the VA, to a different standard with regard to contract set-asides for specific 
disadvantaged concerns. However, if Congress has designs as to which agencies 
should be required to conduct Rule of Two analysis, this intent must be made 
explicitly clear, especially in statutory language, to avoid potential inefficiency or 
litigation. 
 181. Press Release, Representative Mike Coffman, Coffman Legislation 
Streamlines, Modernizes VA Procurement Process (Jun. 15, 2016), 
https://coffman.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/coffman-legislation      
-streamlines-modernizes-va-procurement-process (quoting Colorado Rep. Mike 
Coffman) (“The VA has wasted billions of dollars due to bureaucratic incompetence 
and an inability to follow existing procurement rules.”). 
182. See supra Sections IV.A.3–4. 
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Importantly, any legislative action should preserve the intent of 
Congress, which has been clarified by some of the key legislators who 
supported the original statute and made it law.183 It is also critical to 
avoid the mistakes of the Federal Circuit, which “found that the VA 
did not have to use the Vets First mandate when it had satisfied its 
VOSB goals.”184 This Note submits that there is at least one way to 
satisfy both requirements. The proposed action would be threefold. 
First, Congress could raise the aspirational goal for VA 
procurements through VOSBs and SDOSBs to a level more closely 
tied to the “ceiling,” rather than the “floor.”185 Instead of an agency 
contracting goal of 3%, perhaps 30% is more palatable and ensures 
a strong commitment to veterans by the agency designed to serve 
them. According to the members of Congress who filed briefs on 
behalf of Kingdomware, the Legislature “wanted the VA not just to 
meet, but to exceed its goals.”186 It is unlikely, however, that this would 
be true of a goal as lofty as 30% of a $20 billion VA contracting 
budget. It certainly would be illogical to expect the entire VA budget, 
or even half, to be awarded to VOSBs. Otherwise, why would 
Congress not mandate that all VA contracts go to veterans? 
Additionally, it may be the opinion of some congressional 
members that there is a “strong interest in maximizing veterans’ 
business opportunities and in supporting small business . . . [that] 
does not disappear and reappear depending on whether the VA has 
met self-imposed annual goals,”187 but perhaps Congress should 
create equitable opportunities for other disadvantaged concerns 
that stand to lose their livelihoods to veterans.188 Perhaps Congress 
would feel more confident that the VA was putting veterans first if 
the agency was required to meet a lofty 30% goal, as this Note 
proposes. Surely, at ten times the original goal set in 2003, the VA 
 183. See Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 149, at 6–12. 
 184. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Jonathan T. Williams, Partner, 
PilieroMazza PLLC, at 3) (“The Federal Circuit essentially viewed the VOSB goals 
as a ceiling, rather than a floor, which could have been a dangerous precedent for 
all small business programs. Indeed, the small business contracting goals are the 
bare minimum Congress expects from federal agencies.”). 
185. See id. 
 186. Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 149, at 10. 
187. Id. at 14. 
188. See supra Section IV.A.4. 
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could not be accused of neglecting the brave men and women who 
sacrifice so much for their country. 
Second, Congress could institute quarterly accounting of the 
agency’s progress in attaining this goal. The issue of whether a single 
contracting officer could know if the agency’s goals had or had not 
been attained at any given moment was raised at multiple levels of 
the Kingdomware decision.189 However, the Court itself never 
determined if this type of on-the-fly calculation was possible; it simply 
determined that it was unnecessary given the prefatory nature of the 
goal language.190 It seems likely, however, that a VA-wide contracting 
calculation could be made at the end of each fiscal quarter. Surely, 
with all the reports that the VA is already required to produce,191 
 189. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 754 F.3d 923, 937 (Fed. Cir. 
2014), rev’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016). 
[T]here is no evidence in the record to show that VA contracting officers 
rely on, or have access to, these types of data in making contracting 
decisions, and the GAO has explicitly held that an agency’s belief it has 
satisfied its small business goals does not affect its obligation to conduct 
a Rule of Two analysis. 
Id. 
Congress was well aware that this would be an impossible task for the VA, 
which does not keep track of its actual procurement spending or the 
distribution of that spending in real-time. Although the VA must report 
most contracts to the Federal Procurement Data System (“FPDS”) within 
three business days of the contract award, see 48 C.F.R. § 4.604(b)(2), 
the FPDS data does not have to be certified as complete and accurate 
until 120 days after the fiscal year ends, id. § 4.604(c). Additionally, while 
the VA must measure the extent of participation by small businesses for 
each fiscal year, the VA does not have to report that data to the Small 
Business Administration (“SBA”) until the end of the fiscal year, see id. 
§ 19.202-5(b), and, in fact, these reports often take half of the following
fiscal year to compile, see Press Release, SBA, SBA Announces Results of 
2014 Small Business Federal Procurement Scorecard, U.S. Small Bus. Admin. 
(June 24, 2015), http://tinyurl.com/pm7wszt (announcing, six months 
behind schedule, the small business results for fiscal year 2014). 
Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 
149, at 18–19. 
 190. Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. at 1979 (“We hold that the Rule of Two contracting 
procedures in § 8127(d) are not limited to those contracts necessary to fulfill the 
Secretary’s goals under § 8127(a).”). 
 191. See Contractor Reporting Requirements, GSA VENDOR SUPPORT CTR., 
https://vsc.gsa.gov/administration/crr.cfm (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (“The 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) National Acquisition Center negotiates, 
awards, and administers Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) contracts for various 
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data collection and analysis of this type would not be a substantial 
burden. In the interest of equity, Congress could mandate timely 
reporting practices and provide the resources necessary to 
accomplish such a task. Moreover, meeting this goal of 30% need 
not be tied to exact annual spending. Instead, it could be an estimate 
based on the projected costs of the total procurement contracts for 
that quarter compared with the amount that was awarded to VOSBs. 
It hardly appears likely that the VA has any malicious intent or 
interest in excluding veteran small-business owners from the 
agency’s contracting process. Therefore, Congress should trust the 
VA to make a good faith evaluation of whether or not it has met the 
30% goal in a given quarter before it determines the necessary set-
aside practices for the next quarter. 
Third, Congress could declare that the VA would be required to 
consider all other disadvantaged concerns on equal footing with 
veteran-owned businesses for a quarter when the percentage of 
SDVOSBs and VOSBs used in contracts is above the 30% threshold. 
In this way, if the VA were to meet its aspirational goal for one 
quarter, the statute would allow other disadvantaged concerns a 
chance to reap the benefits of the Rule of Two and provide them 
access to the VA’s large budget. Then, at the beginning of the next 
quarter, the VA would be required to again put “veterans first” if the 
VA had not satisfied its 30% goal. The balance of VA contracting 
would therefore be stilted in favor of veterans, but the agency would 
have the ability to tilt the scales in favor of other disadvantaged 
concerns who would also benefit from government contracting 
opportunities once veterans had taken their share. 
While this system of accounting may appear convoluted, it is 
surely a more equitable solution than to simply hand the lion’s share 
of a $20 billion government budget to SDVOSBs and VOSBs at the 
cost of all other disadvantaged groups. Additionally, this plan would 
not completely tie the agency’s hands. The VA would still retain its 
discretion to find the “best value” for the United States192 but would 
be prevented from “abandon[ing] any interest in fostering veteran-
owned businesses until the start of the next fiscal [quarter].”193 
healthcare-related products and services. All VA managed FSS contract holders are 
required to report contract sales on a quarterly basis.”). 
192. 38 U.S.C. § 8127(d) (2012). 
 193. Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 149, at 7. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Court in Kingdomware came to the correct legal conclusion 
based on the principles of statutory interpretation, but strict reading 
of the relevant text upends the status quo and is likely to lead to 
unsavory results for the VA, other contracting government agencies, 
and nonveteran-owned contractors. Outcomes will include 
inefficiencies, discrepancies in practice across government agencies, 
and loss of opportunities for other disadvantaged groups. These 
problems may require corrective action from either Congress or the 
government agencies in question, as evidenced by congressional 
testimony and agency memoranda.194 While Kingdomware is cause for 
celebration among veterans and narrow constructionists, it may 
create a headache for the United States government, because it 
presents consequences beyond what even the eminent legal minds 
of the Court had envisioned. It is imperative that Congress take 
corrective action to smooth out the inefficiencies and restore equity 
to government contracting practices. Otherwise, government 
agencies ranging from the Department of Justice to the SBA will be 
hauled into court to face more contentious litigation in the near 
future. Congress may be hesitant to act, and litigation can take years. 
Therefore, in all likelihood it will be some time before Kingdomware’s 
exact implications are realized.195 
194. See supra Section IV.B. 
195. Id. 
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